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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
JESUS A. JIMENEZ, : Case No. 20100162 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
POINT I 
SENDING THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE TO THE JURY ON 
A FLAWED UNSUPPORTED THEORY IS ERROR. THE COURT OF 
APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO REVERSE 
THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION. 
For purposes of convenience and continuity only, this Reply Brief follows 
the outline, more or less, of Respondent's Brief in responding to the State's 
arguments. 
A. The trial court erred by sending an unsupported theory to the 
jury-
The State argues first that a valid "independent basis" exists which supports 
the jury's verdict in the trial court, and that even if other alternative bases are 
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fraught with infirmities, an appellate court need not address whether the trial court 
erred in submitting the alternative bases to the jury. Br. Respondent at 8-11. 
In support of this position it cites State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, 95 
P.3d 1216, affd, 2005 UT 48, 122P.3d 571 [^20 (affirming a trial court's refusal to 
accept the plea bargain where sound grounds existed for the trial court's refusal in 
addition to those attacked); State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (Utah App. 1998) at 12, 
13 (defendant failed to attack two of the four sentencing factors considered by the 
trial court, the unchallenged two of which were ostensibly valid); Andersen v. 
Professional Escrow Service, Inc., 118 P.3d 75 (Idaho 2005) (alternative grounds 
not assailed on appeal support motion to dismiss in a civil case); Greenwood v. 
Blackjack Cattle Co., 464 P.2d 281 (Kan. 1970) (When the trial court's decision is 
based on alternative grounds, appellant's failure to challenge all grounds on appeal 
"renders unnecessary a decision on the issue that is raised"); San Antonio Press, 
Inc. v. Custom Built Machinery, 852 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.App. 1993) (unchallenged 
alternative grounds supported judgment). Lastly, the State cites 5 Am. Jur. 2nd 
Appellate Rev. §775, which stands for the proposition indicated ("where a separate 
and independent ground from the one appealed supports the judgment made below, 
and is not challenged on appeal, the court must affirm.") See Br. Respondent at P. 
The State's argument is inapposite. None of the cases cited, nor the 
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reference to 5 Am. Jur. 2n §775 or the cases cited therein, support the proposition 
that the trial court does not err by submitting an erroneous or unsupported 
alternative theory to the jury for its consideration. The jury in the court below may 
well have arrived at a verdict of guilt based upon the unsupported erroneous 
alternative, regardless of what the trial judge may have had in mind. Because the 
jury is the finder of fact, it is not the judge's ultimate decision but integrity of the 
jury's verdict which is in issue and that was dependent upon the trial court's 
submission of factually and legally supported alternative theories. 
The State cites no authority for the proposition that it is permissible for a 
trial court to submit an erroneous alternative theory, i.e., imputing knowledge of a 
gun being used or a reasonable basis upon which to believe "serious bodily injury" 
would occur, upon which the jury may convict a criminal defendant. The reason is 
that there is no such authority. Jury verdicts may not be impeached. Utah R. Evid. 
606(b) prohibits "virtually all inquiries into the jury deliberation process." State v. 
Santana-Ruiz, 2007 UT 59, f 33, 167 P.3d 1038. See also State v. Lucero, 866 
P.2d 1, 4 (UT Ct. App. 1993)(quoting Utah R. Evid. 606(b)). As there is no means 
of determining which alternative, or what combination of the two, may have served 
to form the basis of the jury's verdict, the authorities cited by the State simply have 
no application. 
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The State has raised the question as to whether a jury verdict can be 
supported, given two alternative bases upon which to convict, one legally 
erroneous and unsupported, the others at least arguably correct. This is hardly 
analogous to appealing from a judge's ultimate decision, as urged by the State, 
e.g., dismissing a civil case, refusing a plea bargain, or sentencing a defendant 
where an appellant has cherry picked the questionable grounds and ignored the 
sound ones. Br. Respondent at 8-11. 
The trial court's decision to submit both theories, one erroneous and 
unsupported, the other arguably correct, to the jury calls into question the 
unanimity of the jury's decision. See Article I, §10, Utah State Constitution. The 
judge was not the finder of fact in this case and it was not his decision to convict, 
given the alternatives. The State's analysis is therefore unsound with respect to the 
trial court's decision to submit the two alternative theories to the jury. The 
question is not what the judge may have found had he been the fact finder, as was 
the case in all of the authorities cited by the State, but upon what theory the jury 
may have relied? 
The "independent grounds" analysis advanced by the State is flawed and 
the cases cited inapposite to a jury verdict. Article 1, Section 10 of the Utah State 
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Constitution requires that jury verdicts be unanimous. Utah Const. Art. I, §10; 
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, \ 32, 40 P.3rd 611; State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951, 
966 (Utah 1999). "The jury could have returned a guilty verdict with each juror 
deciding guilt on the basis of a different act by defendant." Saunders at ^62. 
It has been held that where alternative theories are charged 
unanimity as to the means or methods is not a requirement. State v. Powell, 
872 P. 2d 1027 (Utah 1994). This statement of principle is, however, 
limited and lends itself only to the mens rea requirement. State v. Saunders, 
1999 UT 59, ft.nt. 3, 992 P.2d 951, discussing, inter alia, State v. Russel, 
733 P. 2d 162, 165-69 (Utah 1987). That is of particular importance given 
this Court's recent decision in State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, P.3d , 
as discussed, infra. As stated in Saunders, 
The principle that jury verdicts must be unanimous is a 
fundamental tenet of criminal law. Article I, Section 10 of the 
Utah Constitution specifically provides: "In criminal cases the 
verdict shall be unanimous." This Court has recognized that 
principle in a long line of cases, (citations omitted) 
The Article I, Section 10 requirement that a jury be unanimous is 
not met if a jury unanimously finds only that a defendant is 
guilty of a crime. For example, if a jury were given no elements 
instructions, a unanimous guilty verdict would not meet the 
requirements of Article I, Section 10. Nor would a guilty verdict 
be valid if some jurors found a defendant guilty of robbery while 
others found him guilty of theft, even though all jurors agree 
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that he was guilty of some crime. Nor would a verdict be valid if 
some jurors found a defendant guilty of a robbery committed on 
December 25, 1990, in Salt Lake City, but other jurors found him 
guilty of a robbery committed January 15, 1991, in Denver, 
Colorado, even though all jurors found him guilty of the elements 
of the crime of robbery and all the jurors together agreed that he 
was guilty of some robbery. Jury unanimity means unanimity as to a 
specific crime and as to each element of the crime. However, 
because time itself is not an element of an offense, see State v. 
Distefano, 70 Utah 586, 595, 262 P. 113, 116 (1927); State v. 
Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 14, 206 P. 717, 720 (1922); State v. Sheffield, 45 
Utah 426, 433-39, 146 P. 306, 308-11 (1915); State v. Moore, 41 Utah 
247, 252-54, 126 P. 322, 324 (1912), it is not necessary that the jurors 
unanimously agree as to just when the criminal act occurred. Thus, a 
jury can unanimously agree that a defendant was guilty of a particular 
act or acts that constituted a crime even though some jurors believed 
the crime occurred on one day while the other jurors believed it 
occurred on another day. [FN 3] 
Id., W 59, 60 (the reference to footnote 3 is quoted supra). 
For the foregoing reasons, the State's "independent grounds" 
analysis fails. The trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury on 
unsupported grounds, irrespective of the existence of an alternative 
independent ground upon which the jury may have, were it possible to make 
that determination, come to a unanimous conclusion. 
B. The error was too plain and too obvious to survive invited error 
analysis. 
The circumstances of this case are too plain, manifest, and unexceptional for 
the trial court not to have corrected it. The crux of the issue is that the problem 
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created (attempting to determine which of the alternatives formed the basis of the 
jury's verdict, and the unanimity thereof) is of Constitutional dimension, as noted, 
supra. Therefore, it must be found not to have been erroneous beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Reversal is required "if the error was prejudicial to the 
substantial rights of the party." State v. Tilalia, 2006 UT App. 474, ^ 9, 153 P.3d 
757. A conviction must be set aside if the record on the whole indicates that the 
constitutional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., citing 
Deleware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2nd 674 
(1986). 
The State cites two recent cases from this Court which it urges are contrary 
to the position of the Petitioner. Certainly, In re I.R.C., 2010 UT 41, 232 P.3d 
1040 and State v. Jeffs, supra, could not have been controlling as they had not been 
decided at the time of trial, and would not have been decisive of the issue in any 
event. See Br. Respondent, ft.nt. 2, p. 22. If anything however, the language the 
State cites from Jeffs lends greater support the Defendant's argument than to the 
State's. In Jeffs, this Court made crystal clear that accomplice liability must be 
based upon the mens rea of the accomplice, not the principal, 
"'[t]o show accomplice liability, the State must show than an 
individual acted with both the intent that the underlying offense be 
committed and the intent to aid the principal actor in the offense.'" 
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Id. at f 51 (quoting State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, ^  13, 197 P.3d 628). 
The facts in In re IR.C. do bear some relationship to the instant 
matter. The juvenile defendant was the wheelman in a robbery wherein a 
facsimile dangerous weapon was used by the principal. This case is 
however, quite distinguishable if for no other reason that it involved a 
confession from the minor that he was aware of the gun, which was found 
under his seat of the car. The inferences drawn from the facts were found to 
support a "very low" standard for probable cause at a preliminary hearing. 
Id. at T| 9. In addition there is the crucial element that, "(T)he teen admitted 
that Mr. Rodriguez (the principal) told him he intended to use the weapon in 
the robbery while the pair drove to the restaurant." Id. at 110. 
The several cases cited by the State from other jurisdictions under 
distinguishable statutes are also unavailing to the State. See Defendant's analysis 
Point I.C. La., infra. 
C. The Court of Appeals incorrectly rejected Defendant's 
claim that the trial court committed plain error for not sua sponte 
dismissing the aggravated robbery charge. 
1. There was error. 
a. The Court of Appeals incorrectly found that no error 
occurred based upon the fact that the petitioner need not have 
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been aware that a gun was present. 
The Defendant has previously briefed this issue and will not reiterate what 
has been plainly set forth in its opening brief. Brief of Petitioner, Point I. The 
Defendant disagrees with the State's position with respect to this issue, i.e., that the 
"Legislature's policy decision that those participating in any robbery, whether as 
principals or as accomplices, who intend that a robbery be committed, face strict 
liability for the use of a gun . . . " See Br. Respondent at 18. The State cites no 
authority for this proposition. The State writes that, "(A)ny party - principal or 
accomplice - who participates in a robbery assumes the risk that someone may 
resort to the use of a dangerous weapon and/or cause serious bodily injury," citing 
for authority the aggravated robbery statute, §76-6-302 U.C.A. Id. However, the 
statute itself does not mention anything about such an "assumption of risk," and 
with respect to the issue of whether the principal possessed a gun, it finds no 
support in Utah law as Petitioner has argued in his opening brief. The 
Court should decline review of this conclusory claim, which lacks both citation to 
authority and "reasoned analysis based on that authority." West Jordan City v. 
Goodman, 2006 UT 27,129, 135 P.3d 874, quoting State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, p i , 
973P.2d404. 
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Neither murder, §76-5-203 U.C.A. 2007, Aggravated Robbery, 76-6-302 
U.C.A. 2004, or 76-6-302 U.C.A. 2003 are strict liability crimes. The legislature 
has been very clear that a person may be found criminally liable only if the 
"person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with 
a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, as the 
definition of the offense requires; or (ii) the person's acts constitute an offense 
involving strict liability. §76-2-101 U.C.A. 2005. With respect to the issue of 
whether strict liability applies to a statute, the legislature has been equally clear: 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable 
mental state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a 
culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, 
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility. An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute 
defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose 
criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by 
the statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state. 
76-2-102, U.C.A. 1983, Culpable mental state required — Strict liability 
In fact, the "accomplice" statute, §76-2-202 U.C.A 1973, requires that the 
mental state of the accomplice for the commission of the crime be that of the 
principal in order for criminal responsibility to attach: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another 
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person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
See also Jeffs, supra, passim. 
This is the language which was included, verbatim, in Jury Instruction #33. 
R. 114. In order for Mr. Jiminez to have been convicted of aggravated robbery 
based upon the principal having possessed a gun, there would have to have been 
some knowledge on his part that Mateos possessed a gun. Otherwise he cannot be 
said to have acted with the required mental state as to the intended use of a 
dangerous weapon or with respect to the question of "serious bodily injury." To 
convict the Defendant of aggravated robbery, the State would have to have shown 
that he solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided Mateos 
in the use of a gun or that he reasonably anticipated serious bodily injury could 
result. Defense counsel's failure to move to dismiss on this crucial issue and/or 
fail to request a clarifying jury instruction was reversible error as was argued in 
Petitioner's opening brief. See Br. Petitioner, Point I. 
The Court of Appeals in Jimenez stated: 
Defendant asserts that defense counsel was deficient in 
failing to move for dismissal, and the trial court erred in 
failing to dismiss the charge sua sponte. However, both these 
arguments fail because Defendant falls squarely within the 
statutory scheme of accomplice liability for aggravated robbery. 
By its verdict, the jury found Defendant guilty of knowingly 
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helping Mateos engage in a robbery — at the very least, 
the flight therefrom — and that Mateos used a weapon in 
the course of that robbery. The statutes do not require that the 
jury find that Defendant knew that Mateos had a gun before or 
during the robbery, or that Mateos was still using the gun while 
escaping. The evidence presented and unrebutted was that 
Defendant undoubtedly knew about the gun when he heard the 
gunshot and then saw it in Mateo's possession "in the immediate 
flight after the . . . commission1' of the robbery, see Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-30l(2)(c). Furthermore, Defendant could have been convicted of 
aggravated robbery not on the gun element, but on the alternate 
ground that he facilitated escape after Mateos "cause[d] serious bodily 
injury upon another." See id. § 76-6-301 (l)(b). Accordingly, we 
conclude that there was no deficient performance by defense counsel 
or error by the trial court related to Defendant's conviction of 
aggravated robbery. (Emphasis added) 
Id, H 13. 
The Court of Appeals takes as a given that since the robbery and 
aggravated robbery statutes do not speak to the issue of accomplice liability, 
therefore there is no mens rea requirement with respect to the gun or serious bodily 
injury issues. Because Utah has statutorily addressed the principal of criminal 
liability for complicity, it should not be expected that the substantive statutes 
would necessarily address the issue of accomplice liability. For that, courts must 
look to the accomplice statute, §76-2-202. The question then becomes, what did 
this Defendant, as opposed to the principal, know and when did he know it. 
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The Court of Appeals' statement that, "(T)he evidence presented and 
unrebutted was that Defendant undoubtedly knew about the gun when he heard the 
gunshot and then saw it in Mateo's possession "in the immediate flight after the . . . 
commission11 of the robbery," Jimenez at f 13, is likewise an assumption that only 
a jury should respond to and only after being properly instructed as to the law. 
That there was a gunshot heard by Cassandra Matern is undisputed. R. 148: 68. 
There is no direct evidence as to the source of the shot, and the only circumstantial 
evidence before the jury was that the gun was hidden by Mateos and the Defendant 
at a later time at the Wal-Mart store. R. 148: 68. Thus it still remained arguable 
whether the Defendant knew that Mateos had a gun even after he returned from 
The Shop. The possibility that the victim or a patron of The Shop had a gun and 
shot at Mateos is not implausible and cannot be ruled out. There is no testimony or 
evidence to the effect that Cassandra Matem or the Defendant saw the gun until 
later at the Wal-Mart. There is no contrary proof to the effect that Mr. Jimenez 
was unaware of Mateos possession of the gun or the infliction of serious bodily 
injury until well after the parties were on their way and actually at the Wal-Mart. 
The evidence presents a serious question as to the Defendant's mens rea 
and scienter as those concepts apply under the accomplice statute, §76-2-202 
U.C.A. The State cites several authorities which it says stand for the proposition 
- 1 3 -
that an accomplice in a robbery where a principal uses a gun need not be aware of 
the presence of the gun in order to be subject to the greater penalty for robbery 
wherein a gun is utilized. 
The first such case, People v. Parker, 97 A.D.2d 943 [4th Dept 1983], Br. 
Respondent, p. 24, consists of one brief paragraph, citing People v. Gomez, 87 A. 
D.2 829 (2d Dept 1982) an equally uninformative brief one paragraph case. 
Parker makes reference to no statutory authority respecting accomplice liability 
whatsoever, and fails utterly to address the question of whether Parker was aware 
at the time the robbery occurred that the principal "possessed," as distinguished 
from "used," a gun, which is the specific issue in the case at bar. 
A second case cited, United States v. Sanborn, 563 F.2d 488, 491 (1st Cir. 
1977), Br. Respondent, p. 25, in favor of the proposition that an accomplice need not 
be aware that a gun was possessed or being used, holds contrary to the proposition 
for which the State cites it. The First Circuit Court of Appeals stated the 
following, 
. . . (T)he modern case law tends to support the view that one charged 
as an aider and abettor of an aggravated robbery, requiring proof of 
use of a dangerous weapon, must be shown to have contemplated 
that a weapon would be used. See Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 
365 Mass. 1, 8-9, 309 N.E.2d 182,186-187 (1974); see also United 
States v. Methvin, 441 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1971). An aider and 
abettor need not know every last detail of the substantive 
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offense, see Williams v. United States, 308 F.2d 664,666 (9th 
Cir. 1962), but he must share in the principal's essential 
criminal intent. Johnson v. United States, 195 F.2d 673, 675-676 
(8th Cir. 1952); P. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and 
Procedure § 114 at 247 (1957). While the § 2113(d) offense does 
not, in so many words, require the principal to be aware that 
he is using a dangerous weapon, his own knowledge is manifest 
from the fact of use, and in seeking to convict an aider and 
abetter of the aggravated offense we think the Government must 
show that the accomplice knew a dangerous weapon would be used or 
at least that he was on notice of the likelihood of its use. The 
accomplice's knowledge that use of a dangerous weapon was fairly 
within the robbery plan need not, of course, be shown by explicit 
proof of expressed intention; the jury may infer such knowledge 
from the whole circumstances. On this record, as already 
indicated, we would have no hesitancy whatever in affirming the 
present conviction for the aggravated crime had the court given 
an instruction that the Government had to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Sanborn was on notice of the likelihood 
that a gun or other dangerous weapon would be used in the 
robbery. Absent any such instruction following upon defendant's 
explicit request,[fh 4] we are obliged to vacate the judgment of 
conviction for the aggravated § 2113(d) offense. Because the 
court's erroneous failure to instruct went only to the aggravated 
offense carrying a higher maximum sentence, and because we find 
no other error, so much of the judgment may stand as is a 
conviction of the lesser offense of robbery under § 2113(a). 
Alternatively, Sanborn may be retried for the aggravated offense, 
(emphasis supplied). 
Id at 491. 
Perhaps the only marginally persuasive authority presented by the State 
is State v. Walker, 154 N.C. 645,154 N.C. App. 645 (2002). Br. Respondent at 25. 
This case involved a home invasion burglary/robbery wherein three black men of 
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the four participants were clearly identified as possessing guns. Id., p. 647-648. 
Four Young men, "acting kind of nervous," were identified as entering the 
residence by an independent witness. Id., p. 649. The defendant Walker, although 
not fingered as having a gun himself, was identified by one of the victim's present 
in the home as having been rummaging around in one of the back rooms during the 
time the other three were accosting the victims with guns in the front of the house: 
"She testified that Ricardo told her, "Mommy, there's someone else in the house... 
. . Mommy, it's Antwane." Ricardo told his mother that, although he had "a 
pillowcase over his face," he recognized Walker's white Reeboks and baggy jeans. 
Id. at 648. Shortly after the individuals left the house, the police followed a 
burgundy Ford Tauras, occupied by four black males, which had been identified in 
front of the victim's house at the time of the incident, and four black males were 
observed exiting and entering an apartment building. A search of the vehicle 
revealed a gun in the glove compartment. Further search of the apartment building 
revealed, "two men downstairs and defendant upstairs wearing baggy blue jeans 
and white Reeboks. The keys to the Ford Taurus were in a room across the hall 
from where defendant was sitting." Id. at 648. 
Thus there was a substantial factual basis to impute knowledge to Walker of 
the presence and use of guns by the other assailants. The Walker court, based upon 
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prior case law, recited the following basis for its finding Walker to have been 
guilty of burglary/robbery by use of a gun: 
[I]f 'two persons join in a purpose to commit a 
crime, each of them, if actually or constructively 
present, is not only guilty as a principal if the 
other commits that particular crime, but he is also 
guilty of any other crime committed by the other in 
pursuance of the common purpose . . . or as a natural 
or probable consequence thereof.1 
Id. at 650, citing State v. Mann, N.C. App. , 560 S.E. 776, 784 (2002). The 
court in Walker determined that the evidence was sufficient to connect Walker to a 
common plan or scheme to break into the victim's house and to commit armed 
robbery of the occupants. Id. It further specifically held that the evidence was 
sufficient to impute his "acting in concert" to commit burglary and armed robbery 
and that, "(Accordingly, the trial court did not err . . . in instructing the jury on 
constructive possession (of a gun)." Id. For like reasons, the Walker court found 
that the trial court's failure to dismiss the aggravated charges based upon Walker's 
mere presence was not error. Id. 
A subsequent North Carolina unpublished opinion. State v. Davis, 609 
S.E.2d 498, 168 N.C. App. 729 (2005) elucidates the distinction between the 
"acting in concert" rubric applied by the courts in North Carolina. Davis involves 
an aggravated robbery, wherein the defendant claimed that the trial court erred (1) 
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in denying his motion to dismiss based upon insufficient evidence; (2) in failing to 
further clarify the definition of "acting in concert." Id. at 729. The court in Davis 
stated as follows: 
To obtain a conviction of attempted robbery with a dangerous 
weapon, the State must prove that the defendant, having "the 
specific intent to unlawfully deprive another of personal 
property by endangering or threatening his life with a dangerous 
weapon, d[id] some overt act calculated to bring about th[at] 
result." State v. Miller, 334 N.C. 658, 667-68, 477 S.E.2d 915, 921 
(1996). Under the theory of acting in concert, "if two or 
more persons act together in pursuit of a common plan or purpose, 
each of them, if actually or constructively present, is guilty of 
any crime committed by any of the others in pursuit of the common 
p\m."State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 456, 533 S.E.2d 168, 228 
(2000), (citing State v. Laws, 352 N.C. 81, 97, 381 S.E. 609, 618 
(1989)), cert, denied, 532 U.S. 931, 149 L. Ed. 2d 305 
(2001). A person is constructively present during the commission 
of a crime if he is close enough to provide assistance and 
encourage the actual execution of the crime. Id. 
In the instant case, defendant was convicted under a theory of 
acting in concert. The evidence tended to show that Murphy, who 
allegedly had previously purchased marijuana from Wiggins and 
Bayless, believed that the two had "a trash bag full of marijuana 
and a shoe box full of money." By defendant's own admission, once 
the three men arrived at the apartment, and "when [Murphy] 
figured out they wasn't home, he wanted to go get it, and I acted 
in concert by following him.". . . 
There was then sufficient evidence that defendant had the intent 
to unlawfully take and carry away certain property from the 
victims — be it by breaking and entering, or by robbery; that he, 
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along with Murphy and Thibeau, took steps beyond mere preparation 
to commit that crime; and that during the attempt to commit said 
unlawful act, things went awry, causing injury to his two 
co-conspirators. Under the theory of acting in concert, 
defendant's admitted presence pursuant to an agreement to break 
and enter and the acts taken by him in furtherance thereof, was 
sufficient to impute responsibility for the ultimate crime that 
was charged here. See State v. Walker, 154 N.C. App. 645,650, 572 
S.E.2d 866, 870 (2002) (rejecting the defendant's argument 
that he could not be convicted under the theory of acting in 
concert because there was insufficient evidence to show that 
there was a common plan or scheme to break into the victims1 home 
and commit armed robbery). In the light most favorable to the 
State, the evidence was sufficient to submit the issue of 
defendant's guilt to the jury. Accordingly, the trial court did 
not err in denying his motion to dismiss. 
Id. 
On its face the "acting in concert" principal employed by the courts in 
North Carolina differs from Utah's "accomplice" statute, §76-2-202 U.C.A., 
it would appear, in that Utah's statute clearly requires that the accomplice, to 
be found guilty as the principal, must possess the requisite intent to be found 
responsible for the acts of the principal. See Id, and Jeffs, supra, at 151. As 
a practical matter, the North Carolina cases would seem to require 
substantial and realistic evidence that a participant was acting with the 
required mental state to be held responsible for a crime committed by 
another. 
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b. There was error due to the fact that no evidence or logical 
inferences to be drawn therefrom which established that the 
Defendant knew a gun was present. 
This point likewise has previously been analyzed. Br. Petitioner Point /, 
passim. The State's position regarding some of the inferences drawn from the 
circumstances, which it advances as a basis for the defendant's knowledge that 
Mateo possessed a gun, are simply far-fetched, in defendant's view. The defendant 
drew all reasonable inferences from the facts and could divine no basis for such 
knowledge. Br. Petitioner, passim. 
Respondent's position that the Defendant failed to marshall the evidence is 
not well taken. See Br. Respondent at fn. 1, p. 19. The Defendant went to great 
lengths to summarize the evidence and testimony in careful and accurate detail in 
his opening brief. See Br. Petitioner, Trial Proceedings and Testimony, p. 6-18. 
Thereafter, with full understanding of the marshalling requirement set forth in Rule 
24(A)(9) Utah R. App. P., Defendant drew all logical and sensible inferences 
which could be drawn from the evidence and advanced those inferences under 
Point I.A.2. "Lack of Factual Basis to Submit Aggravated Robbery to Jury." Br. 
Petitioner p. 24-26. 
The State has drawn inferences from some rather meaningless 
circumstances, in the Defendant's opinion, e.g., the notion that the fact that the 
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defendant drove back and forth in front of The Shop somehow supports knowledge 
that Mateos had a gun. Br. Respondent, p. 19. The defendant simply thinks this, 
along with other such mundane or speculative factual conclusions, is ridiculous. 
To the extent that the defendant has missed minor inconsequential inferences, 
however speculative, and fanciful, which might have been drawn, the State has 
filled in the blanks. Br. Respondent p. 19-20. The defense simply views the facts 
quite differently and believes those facts cited by the State do not serve to support 
such an inference. The defendant complied with Rule 24(A)(9) Utah R. App. P. 
2. Error occurred and it was obvious. 
There was error and it was obvious, too obvious to survive invited error 
analysis. This issue was brief in Petitioner's opening brief. See Br. Petitioner, 
Point III, p. 36-37. 
3. The error was not harmless. 
It was error for the court to submit an erroneous jury instruction giving rise 
to the likelihood of a divided jury verdict nevertheless finding guilt unanimously. 
This issue was briefed in Petitioner's opening brief. See Br. Petitioner, Point III, p. 
34-37. 
D. The Court of Appeals incorrectly rejected Defendant's claim that 
counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss the aggravated robbery 
charge. 
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The State contends this was a "novel question." Br. Respondent at 29. 
It may be of first impression here, but it is novel only in the sense that the 
question identified has not previously been addressed by Utah courts. If an 
enhanced conviction (aggravated robbery over simple robbery) can be had 
upon knowledge of a gun, and the defendant had no such knowledge, that 
does not present a novel question, it is just common sense and patently 
obvious that counsel should request a jury instruction reflecting the 
requirement of such knowledge, in addition to making a motion to dismiss. 
The Defendant has cited substantial existing authority to the effect 
that "scienter" is required for conviction as a principal for an offense 
involving an accomplice possessing or using a gun. See Br. Petitioner Point 
I, passim. 
Particularly when the trial court telegraphs to counsel that it has 
spotted an issue that may be of assistance if counsel would but speak on her 
client's behalf, as where the trial court asked counsel whether prior 
knowledge of the gun was required during her motion to dismiss, R. 149:8, it 
seems extraordinary that counsel would not jump at the chance to at least 
make a record of urging her client's position. But counsel did not do so. 
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1. Counsel performed deficiently for not challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence to show defendants knowledge of the gun. No 
reasonable strategy existed for not challenging the matter. 
Trial counsel's statement that the State need not show prior knowledge of 
the gun for submission to the jury (R. 149:8) could not have been part of a strategy. 
If it was, bluntly speaking, it was too ill considered to be taken seriously and 
certainly doesn't rise to an acceptable level of professionalism. Nor could the trial 
court have seriously been led astray by counsel's off- hand comment that proof of 
knowledge of the gun was not necessary. 
The State's position regarding counsel's presumed strategy of failing to 
move to dismiss the aggravated robbery does not add up. The State believes that 
by getting rid of the gun alternative, it would have somehow weakened the 
Defendant's position because he would have still been convicted on the 
"overwhelming evidence of serious bodily injury." Br, Respondent at p. 30. 
However, the jury may have believed that not being aware of the gun went hand in 
hand with a complete lack of contemplation that serious bodily injury could have 
occurred. The Court of Appeals is incorrect in its statement that it was inevitable 
that, even if the gun charge were dismissed, the jury would have been compelled to 
convict of aggravated robbery based upon the serious bodily injury prong of the 
statute. See Jimenez at 113. 
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As murder can be based upon simple robbery as well as aggravated robbery, 
it was appropriate for counsel to move to dismiss the entire robbery, aggravated or 
otherwise. However, as the State seems to suggest, Br. Respondent at p. 30, 
counsel was not precluded from arguing that if the trial court did not see fit to 
dismiss the robbery outright, it should dismiss the aggravated robbery on the basis 
that the Defendant had no knowledge of the gun and could not have contemplated 
serious bodily injury. Had the trial court dismissed the aggravated robbery, 
counsel would have still been in an excellent position to argue that the Defendant 
did not know there was going to be a robbery at all How a dismissal of the 
aggravated robbery charge would have compromised the Defendant's position is 
quite literally impossible to fathom. It may very well have been that the jury 
convicted on the basis of the gun alternative, ignoring the "serious bodily injury" 
element. Providing the jury another alternative, one which was unwarranted and 
erroneous, permitted the jury to convict upon an improper standard. 
Likewise, the State's argument that counsel reasonably made a decision to 
run on one "I did not know" defense, is absurd. The State claims that, 
It would have weakened the credibility of the defense to have 
argued that (1) Defendant did not know that Mateos intended to 
commit a robbery and (2) even if Defendant did know about the 
robbery, he didn't know about the gun. Where a conceivable strategic 
reason exists for counsel's not attacking the aggravating factor and for 
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instead attacking the robbery itself, counsel's performance is not 
deficient. See (State v.) Mahi, 2005 UT App 494, ]f 20. 
Br. Respondent at 31. If this was counsel's thinking, it was not a reasonable 
strategy. It would not have been necessary to argue that Defendant did not know 
about the gun had the trial court dismissed the aggravated robbery, or at least that 
prong of the charge. As matters stood in the court below, counsel was left in the 
very position the State claims would have hurt the defense's credibility: counsel 
was required to argue that that (1) Defendant did not know that Mateos intended to 
commit a robbery and (2) even if Defendant did know about the robbery, he didn't 
know about the gun. 
The notion that counsel employed a reasonable strategy is 
simply unfounded in logic. 
2. Counsel performed deficiently for not moving to dismiss, as the 
matter was too plain and obvious for counsel not to know that the accomplice 
must be aware that the principal has a gun. 
This issue has been briefed previously at Point LB., supra. 
3. Counsel performed deficiently because the evidence clearly 
established that the defendant in fact did not know a gun would be used. 
As previously argued, there was not a scintilla of evidence establishing that 
the defendant knew there was a gun in the possession of the shooter. See Point 
I.C. Lb., supra. 
-25-
4. Even though the victim suffered serious bodily injury, the 
defendant was prejudiced. 
For the reasons set forth previously, the defendant was seriously prejudiced. 
See Point I.C.3., supra. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
IMPOSITION OF THE DANGEROUS WEAPON PENALTY ENHANCEMENT, 
A. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that invited error 
precluded a finding of plain error or manifest injustice. 
The Defendant does not dispute the State's contention that error was invited 
by counsel's inadequate performance with respect to this jury instruction. 
B. The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that the Defendant 
had not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The State claims that the failure of defense counsel at trial to object to jury 
instruction No. 42 (R. Rl22-23), which it acknowledges was erroneous by 
"inadvertently" omitting the required element that the defendant "knew that the 
dangerous weapon was present," did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Br. Respondent at 41. Inadvertent or not, this essential element was 
omitted from the instruction, it was erroneous, it was highly prejudicial, and 
counsel should have objected to it. 
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Having fully analyzed this issue in its opening brief, Br. Petitioner, Points I 
& III, the Defendant believes no further response is required and submits the issue. 
POINT III 
THE REMEDY IS A NEW TRIAL. 
While the Defendant acknowledges that this Court has the power to do 
exactly as it pleases, and that the authorities cited by the State are not inapplicable. 
However, it would serve the ends of justice best, in the view of this Defendant, in 
order to vouchsafe a fair trial if this matter were reversed and remanded to the trial 
court for a new trial of the issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests that this case be 
reversed and remanded to the trial court for a new trial of the issues. 
DATED: December 1, 2010. 
J^RSCHEL BULLEN 
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner 
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